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Conceptualizing Dynamic Challenges to Global Financial 
Diffusion: Islamic Finance and the Grafting of Sukuk 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Following the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-9, there has been renewed interest in 
the diffusion and pluralization of financial ideas and practices, and in understanding 
how new ideas and practices can emerge to challenge the prevalence and diffusion 
of dominant ones. However, existing concepts and language in the broader literature 
on diffusion limit our ability to analyze and assess the contestation of ideas, 
especially as it is sustained and transformed over time. In this paper, we develop the 
concept of grafting as a post-equilibrium approach to analyze the ongoing 
contestation of global finance at the level of market practice. We apply our 
conceptual framework to analyze the complex dynamics of a class of financial assets 
that in recent years has made significant inroads in global financial markets: sukuk, 
often referred to as Islamic bonds. We highlight dynamic differences in the grafting 
of ideas and practices from Islam and conventional finance and suggest that the 
grafting of sukuk is an ongoing contestation of the diffusion of global finance that 
contributes to the emergence of an increasingly pluralistic global economy. 
 
Key words: global finance; diffusion; Islam; sukuk; Southeast Asia; GCC 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Following the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008-9, there has been renewed interest in 
the diffusion and pluralization of financial ideas and practices, and in particular, in 
understanding how new ideas and practices can emerge to challenge the prevalence and 
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diffusion of dominant ones. However, existing concepts and language in the broader literature 
on diffusion limit our ability to analyze and assess the contestation of ideas, especially over 
time (for a discussion, see Solingen 2012). Work in the field of International Political 
Economy (IPE) has tended to focus on the spread of a dominant set of ideas but rarely on 
how contending ideas might co-mingle in or more overtly contest – and in some cases even 
reverse - the flow of diffusion over time. As a result, the main conceptualizations of pathways 
of diffusion in the literature – coercion, emulation, mock-compliance and localization as well 
as their variants – point to the resolution of or success in the transplantation of generally the 
dominant set of ideas. Even mock compliance and localization suggest the – at least partial - 
adoption of external ideas, albeit not their full internalization. In doing so, the existing 
literature on diffusion has tended to downplay enduring dynamics of contestation. In this 
paper, we develop the concept of grafting as a post-equilibrium approach to understanding 
the ongoing contestation of global finance at the level of market practice.  
The concept of grafting has previously been applied in diffusion studies, specifically in 
accounts of norm localization. We follow the literature’s definition of grafting as the 
‘melding’ of two sets of ideas, norms, policies or practices. However, we think that this 
definition of grafting has a number of dynamic implications that have not been fully 
exhausted. There are three further key reasons to the significance of grafting. First, there are 
the dynamics of the graft product itself. Grafting creates composites in which alternative 
ideas co-mingle. Through an iterative grafting process, it is possible to vary the relative 
content of the graft. Stability of the graft, amongst other things, depends on the compatibility 
of alternative ideas (or norms or policies or practices), the ways in which they interact as well 
as the pathological aspects of the graft. Second, conceptualizing grafting as an iterative 
process allows taking into account both the alteration and the dynamic development of source 
models. Grafts can be renewed by either substituting one or both of the component parts. This 
includes grafting new composites using one or more pre-existing grafts. Third, grafting does 
not occur within a vacuum. The success and long-term survival of a graft – as well as its 
development over time – are closely linked to contextual, agential and in some cases even 
commercial factors, which we discuss below. 
We apply our conceptual framework to analyze the development over time of a class of 
financial assets that in recent years has made significant inroads into global financial markets: 
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sukuk, often also referred to as Islamic bonds.1 Sukuk are instruments used to arrange 
financing for corporate and sovereign actors; this alone makes them inherently political. In 
general discussions, they are often termed Islamic bonds although it would be more correct to 
refer to them as Islamic investment certificates. A sukuk has to conform to a number of 
precepts that are found in the sharia (popularly known as Islamic law) to be deemed 
compliant with Islam. The two main characteristics are that (1) there be no element of interest 
(riba or usury), and (2) the financial instrument must be linked to a tangible asset (which 
economists refer to as ‘real’ asset).  
 It is now widely accepted that today’s conventional finance specifically, and the 
capitalist economy more generally, has undergone a significant process of financialization, 
which is generally understood to mean the progressive elevation of the financial sphere above 
the ‘real sector’ of the economy. Whereas in previous decades the financial sector was tightly 
linked to the real sector as the former primarily served the needs of the latter, today it not 
only generates profits on its own but ‘profits [also] accrue primarily through financial 
channels rather than through trade and commodity production’ (Krippner 2005: 174; see also 
Epstein 2005; van der Zwan 2014). Islamic teachings on the other hand emphasize the need 
for economic reward to be associated with tangible contributions to the economy, which is 
promoted by the requirement that financial transactions be linked to real assets. Advocates of 
Islamic finance further emphasize that its ultimate function is to serve the maqasid al-sharia, 
the foundational goals of Islamic jurisprudence, namely the protection of faith, life, progeny, 
intellect and property. To the extent that Islamic finance is subordinated to these goals, it 
serves to challenge the apotheosis of finance in the conventional sector and the global 
economy more broadly. 
A sukuk can be structured in a number of ways, some of which will be discussed briefly 
in this paper. The precise structures of sukuk found in the market are complex discussions on 
their own.2 Here, it suffices to say that sukuk structures involve additional transactions (or 
steps), often considered to be convoluted, in order to serve functionally equivalent purposes 
to conventional bonds. Where there is usually a direct relationship between the investor and 
                                                 
1 ‘Sukuk’ is the plural of ‘sak’ or ‘sakk’ – Arabic for check or deed. In this paper, we follow contemporary 
convention and use ‘sukuk’ as both singular and plural noun. 
2 Latham & Watkins, an international legal advisory firm, produced an accessible guide on structuring sukuk in 
June 2015, which can be downloaded at this link: https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/Latham-guide-to-
structuring-sukuk-2015. 
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the obligor (the bond issuer) in a conventional bond, at least one intermediary actor (usually a 
special purpose vehicle, SPV) is always introduced between the investor and the obligor in a 
sukuk in order to facilitate compliance with sharia precepts. It is important to note that in 
Islamic finance both substance and form matter (Maurer 2010). This can have implications, 
for instance, when it comes to the order in which legal documents are signed. 
The growth of Islamic finance in recent years has been presented as challenge to the 
dominant neoliberal approach to organizing contemporary finance, while simultaneously 
facilitated by actors, techniques and practices derived from ‘conventional’ finance (Zeti 2009; 
Askari et al. 2010). As such, Islamic finance can be understood, to a degree, as an extension 
of the contemporary global diffusion of the processes of financial liberalization (Rethel 2011; 
Fang 2014). This process of diffusion is contested and, as we demonstrate in this paper, the 
phenomenon of Islamic finance is better understood as a ‘grafted’ outcome that embodies 
ideas and practices from both ‘conventional’ finance and Islam. Our findings reveal dynamic 
differences in how ideas from Islam and ‘conventional’ finance are grafted in Islamic finance, 
which can be explained by variations in the normative and material preferences of key actors 
and institutional constraints posed by developments in the ‘conventional’ and Islamic sectors. 
Our conclusion in this regard speaks to an extensive literature that points to a variegated 
understanding of capitalisms and in particular the pluralization of finance, and emphasizes 
further how these complex dynamics unfold over time (Hall and Soskice 2001; Brenner et al. 
2010; Bassens 2012).  
By analyzing how financial instruments embody contested ideas and how dynamics of 
contestation unfold over time, we demonstrate that the process of diffusion, in particular 
partial diffusion, can also take place at the level of market practice, an understudied area in 
international politics. There is an emerging recognition that the design of financial 
instruments is no mere technical matter but is rather an exercise in which a number of 
political and normative assumptions become imbued in market practice. In reference to the 
GFC, it is now widely observed that the design of collateralized debt obligations was not 
neutral but rather embodied normative understandings of the distribution of risks and 
economic rewards, which were reflective of a larger socio-economic system that placed great 
value on financial innovation and the creation of financial wealth. It has been argued that 
social institutions and policy approaches reflect normative and political preferences, however 
this paper, and the observations that emerged from the GFC, make the point that it is equally 
important to study market practices and techniques, such as the design of financial 
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instruments, for their political and normative foundations – and ultimately their contestability 
and reversibility. 
DIFFUSION AND THE POLITICS OF FINANCIAL CHANGE 
The study of diffusion carries with it the notion that a set of ideas, policies or practices is 
dispersed, disseminated, or propagated. Diffusion studies cover a wide range of issue areas: 
from regulatory standards to forms of governance, from social movements to public policy. 
The focus in IPE has tended to be on the process of diffusion, in particular on explaining the 
pathways of diffusion, and how they affect outcomes in diffusion (see also Solingen and 
Börzel 2014). For example, Simmons et al. (2008a) identify coercion, competition, learning 
and emulation as important pathways for the diffusion of markets and democracy. In terms of 
outcomes, their contributors explore inter alia the diffusion of tax policy and investment 
treaties, as well as democratic institutions and gender rights. What many of these studies 
share is that they see diffusion – be it full or partial – as the endpoint; once an idea, policy or 
practice is diffused, equilibrium is restored, order is achieved.3 Yet, what if these ideas, 
norms, policies and practices have an afterlife? How can we account for ongoing dynamics 
of change and contestation? After briefly reviewing core arguments in the diffusion 
literature, we develop a conceptualization of grafting as a post-equilibrium approach to 
diffusion. 
 
Making Sense of Financial Diffusion 
Existing studies of diffusion and financial change can be categorized according to two criteria 
that focus on process and outcome. First, we can think of diffusion as the result of a process 
in which host societies exercise varying degrees of agency. In a situation where the object of 
diffusion is imposed by external forces, then host societies exercise weak degrees of agency. 
We can think of conditionality written into 1980s IMF loan agreements as one example (e.g. 
Mathews 2001; Babb 2013). Conversely, host societies might exercise strong degrees of 
agency by actively and voluntarily participating in the process of diffusion, for instance in 
order to seek solutions to domestic problems. An example of this is the establishment of 
sovereign wealth funds by a number of countries in the 2000s as a means to manage their 
growing financial reserves more effectively (Chwieroth 2014). Second, we can think of the 
                                                 
3 Our usage of the term ‘equilibrium’ in this paper follows the notion of ‘steady state equilibrium’ in 
macroeconomic growth theory. 
6 
outcome of diffusion as sitting along a continuum of harmonization (alternatively 
convergence or isomorphism) to non-harmonization (or partial harmonization), where 
harmonization is the full and substantive embrace of foreign ideas, policies or practices. The 
degree of harmonization reflects the degree of acceptance or internalization by host societies 
of foreign ideas.  
Whether existing studies make reference to full or partial harmonization can be 
influenced by methodological choice. For example, large-N studies often take policy ideas as 
uncontested and seek to test their adoption in different jurisdictions without considering in 
depth that these ideas might be adapted or changed in the process (e.g. Simmons et al. 2008b; 
Chwieroth 2014). They do not ask, for instance, how ideas are embedded or adopted, or if 
they are adapted in kind or purpose (see also Meseguer and Gilardi 2009). By contrast, 
ethnographically informed approaches provide fine-grained analyses of how ideas, policies or 
practices travel and the ways in which they are negotiated at the local level (e.g. Lagerwaard 
2015). Only rarely, however, do these accounts reflect on how – and under what 
circumstances - these localizations in turn influence developments at the core, or how they 
themselves are subject to change.  
The interaction between the agency exercised by the host society and their receptivity 
to foreign ideas results in different diffusive processes. Thus, in categorizing diffusion 
according to these two criteria – the degree of agency (along a continuum of weak to strong) 
on the part of the host society, and the degree of receptivity to foreign ideas (along a 
continuum of full to partial harmonization) – we identify four main varieties of diffusion that 
dominate the literature. These varieties of diffusion, ideal types in the Weberian sense, are 
presented in Table 1. 
 
[Insert table 1 about here] 
 
One common, and long-standing, approach to conceptualizing the diffusion of financial 
policies and ideas invokes the notion of emulation or mimesis. This type of socialized 
diffusion takes place, for example, when actors attempt to solve problems or policy 
challenges in an environment that is rooted in uncertainty and bounded rationality. Here, 
foreign ideas are perceived to be ‘an appropriate or efficient solution (…) irrespective of the 
existence of actual evidence to support this conclusion’ (Chwieroth 2014). The notions of 
emulation and mimesis suggest that the object of diffusion (such as financial practices or 
policy approaches) has been successfully adopted, implanted or accepted in host societies. As 
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such there is harmonization, convergence, isomorphism or compliance in outcome. 
Emulation and mimesis are employed to refer to situations where host societies have 
exercised considerable agency in the process of diffusion. For instance, in his study of the 
spread of sovereign wealth funds, Chwieroth (2014) argues that reserve- and resource-rich 
countries decided to create such funds because they had become a fashionable solution to 
policy challenges among countries with similar characteristics. Emulation is distinct from 
‘learning’, which involves an enhanced understanding and requires evidence of the 
relationship between ideas and outcomes. Klingler-Vidra and Schleifer (2014, 271) suggest 
that the greater reflexivity inherent in learning leads to greater selectivity in terms of the 
adoption and adaption of ‘source model(s)’, which can facilitate ‘less convergence’. 
Coercive diffusion takes place when host societies exercise a weak or low degree of 
agency in either contesting or accepting external ideas or practices. The external pressure, 
both formal and informal, could emanate from foreign governments, international 
organizations, key market actors, or international rules or norms upon which host societies 
depend for power, resources, legitimization or status. For example, it has been demonstrated 
that developing countries’ adoption of ideas and policies associated with the policy paradigm 
of the ‘Washington Consensus’ in the 1980s and 1990s was a result of the combination of the 
exercise of political power by key donor countries and international financial institutions like 
the World Bank and the IMF, the dominance of a particular shared understanding of 
appropriate policy measures by the global community of economic scholars, and the 
expectations of market actors (Chwieroth 2007; Babb 2013). As with socialized diffusion, 
coercive diffusion sees the successful adoption or implantation of foreign ideas, policies or 
practices in host societies, thus resulting in harmonization or convergence in outcome.   
Cosmetic diffusion occurs when host societies do not internalize foreign ideas, but lack 
the capacity to outright reject them. A good example here is that of ‘mock’ compliance by a 
number of East Asian countries with international standards of financial governance (Walter 
2008). According to Walter, the contestation of international standards or ‘mock’ compliance 
happens when the costs of ‘true’ compliance are relatively high, the costs of outright non-
compliance are also relatively high, and the detection of ‘mock’ compliance is relatively low. 
However, East Asian countries were unable to fully resist these standards due to coercive 
pressures, both material and normative, emanating from market forces and international 
actors. As a result of weak agency to fully resist the diffusion of international financial 
standards, but strong motivations to contest these standards, Walter observed ‘mock’ 
compliance, where there is superficial acceptance but not full internalization of the object of 
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diffusion. Cosmetic diffusion is different from coercive diffusion as there is no substantive 
compliance or full convergence in outcome. Walter (2007: 177-180) himself questions 
whether mock compliance is sustainable or whether it will lead to more ‘substantive 
compliance’ over time. In the case of adopting international financial standards he remains 
skeptical, but we would like to caution against equating this with no change taking place at 
all – mock compliance is far removed from stasis. Drawing on the work of postcolonial 
theorist Homi Bhabha, Hobson and Seabrooke (2007: 17, 14) employ the term  ‘hybridized 
mimicry’ to refer to  instances when ‘agents appear to adopt dominant discourses, but filter 
them through their own cultural lenses so as to produce something new and hybridized’. In so 
doing, subordinate agents can ‘attain agency’, even within structurally confined contexts. The 
relative importance of agency increases further as we move more squarely to the fourth 
variety of diffusion.  
In localized diffusion, host societies exercise considerable agency in melding foreign 
ideas, policies or practices with local beliefs and cultural precepts. The result is a diffusive 
process that does not result in full harmonization. Rather, foreign ideas, policies or practices 
are made ‘to fit’ local contexts (Acharya 2004: 251). Local agents borrow foreign ideas, 
stripping off features that are clearly not compatible with the local context. In turn, these 
ideas might help to amplify, or accentuate, prior held beliefs and practices (Acharya 2004: 
245-6; see also Eimer et al. 2016). Yet, it is precisely the question of how foreign and local 
ideas co-mingle – and the resultant stability (or not) of the graft - which warrants further 
scrutiny.  Thus, for example, in his work on how economic ideas ‘go local’, Ban (2016: 21; 
see also Ban 2013) distinguishes between editing as a way of translating neoliberal ideas that 
does not ‘displace the goals of this school of thought’ and grafting, which ‘challenges the 
distinctive goals of neoliberalism’ and thus contests the source paradigm itself. Localization 
approaches therefore highlight qualitative differences in the extent to which the object of 
diffusion is affected and the stability that is accorded to outcomes. However, this provokes a 
new question: how should we then conceptualize the concrete forces of diffusion and 
contestation at work and their relative impact over time? To this end, we propose moving 
beyond this 2x2 matrix by developing a deeper, three-dimensional conceptualization of 
grafting, which highlights its dynamic features.  
 
The Three Dimensions of Grafting 
In the context of financial diffusion, grafting might occur when the dominant set of ideas 
and/or practices is unable to sweep away its competitors, and when emergent ideas are 
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similarly unable to fully contest dominant ones. The outcome is a composite result that 
nevertheless cannot be reduced to its component parts. Taking an example from horticulture, 
if lemon and orange were each distinctive sets of ideas, then grafting the two might produce a 
new plant, a bizzaria, composed of ‘mixtures’ of lemon and orange characteristics.4 This 
definition of grafting has a number of implications whose import has not been fully 
appreciated in the IPE literature – they pertain to the graft product itself, its component parts 
and the circumstances under which grafting occurs. 
First, there are the substance and dynamics of the graft product itself. Grafting 
creates composite products in which alternative ideas (or norms or policies or practices) co-
mingle. The relative content of a graft can be varied through an iterative grafting process. 
Amongst other things, the stability of the graft depends on the compatibility of alternative 
ideas (their taxonomic affinity), the ways in which they interact throughout the life of the 
graft product as well as the pathological aspects of the graft (that is, in both spreading and 
overcoming ‘diseases’). Since grafting is the result of the melding of ideas through a process 
of contestation, we might expect compromises or distortions in the acceptance, 
implementation or execution of these ideas. A feature of grafting is therefore potential tension 
in the outcome when distinctive sets of ideas coalesce. If these sets of ideas sit imperfectly 
against each other, we would expect them to shift or adjust until a more sustainable 
accommodation is achieved. The success of the graft would depend on a number of factors, 
including the compatibility of each component part and the closeness of fit, among other 
factors.5 Incompatible component parts that are grafted together might produce a result that 
survives for a period of time before it dies. This dimension of grafting closely approximates 
accounts of localized diffusion as discussed in the previous section and we will discuss in the 
next sub-section how it applies to the grafting of the first sukuk. The point to note here is that 
grafting as an analytical tool points to dynamic significance that lies beyond the one-time 
production of hybrid outcomes.  
                                                 
4 See Mudge et al. (2009: 479-480) for a brief history of the bizzaria. In developing our understanding of 
grafting, we draw on recent discussions in the plant science literature, in particular Mudge et al. (2009) and 
Goldschmidt (2014).  
5 Goldschmidt 2014 also refers to instances where graft-take was impacted by plant age. Ban (2016, 244) makes 
a similar point in arguing that ‘the timing of incorporation into the transnational diffusion of neoliberalism’ 
matters. 
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Thus second, understanding grafting as an iterative process allows taking into 
account both the alteration and the dynamic development of source models. Even in the 
case of stable grafts there is no endpoint, no automatic cut-off date by which a lasting, 
harmonious resolution is achieved. Not only do ideas continue to co-mingle (as in the first 
dimension), but existing grafts can also be subject to improvement and renewal and become 
the product of fresh attempts at graft invigoration. Grafts can be renewed by substituting 
either one or both of the component parts. This includes using one or more new or pre-
existing grafts in grafting new composites. This is important as neither foreign nor local 
ideas, policies or practices are ever static – they have both their histories and futures. For 
example, the current international financial system is unrecognizable from how the financial 
system looked at the time modern Islamic finance emerged several decades ago, or for that 
matter how the system was initially designed following the 1944 Bretton Woods conference. 
It would be naïve to ignore how this has filtered back into the ongoing development of 
Islamic financial products (and of the conventional sector). At the same time, greater 
recognition of and familiarity with key precepts of Islam have allowed Islamic finance 
practitioners to experiment with new financial structures. These complex dynamics within 
source models can lead to new grafting attempts as we will highlight in our discussion of 
ijara and wakala sukuk below. 
Third, grafting does not occur within a vacuum, but neither does it change due 
to external stimuli only. The success and long-term survival of graft products as well as 
their development over time are closely linked to – often intersecting - contextual, agential 
and even commercial factors which can be abstracted only to a limited extent. These factors 
play a role with regard to both the question of what produces successful graft-take as well as 
what motivates grafting to occur in the first instance. In our horticultural analogy, climate, 
soil and pathological factors certainly play important roles in facilitating graft-take; at the 
same time, however, climate and soil adaptation as well as the desire to manage and control 
plant pests are important drivers of the engineering of grafts themselves. As grafting as a 
practice becomes more widespread, the technical repertoire of its agents grows. Similarly, 
increasing familiarity with grafting techniques and outputs can lead to their wider acceptance. 
In so doing, endogenous components also play an important role. We will discuss these 
dynamics in the final sub-section of the next part of the paper.    
Our notion of grafting departs in a significant way from the four main approaches to 
diffusion discussed in the previous section. For us, grafting characterizes a diffusive process 
that is more dynamic than the two-step sequential process of stimulus/outcome that has 
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captured so much attention in the existing literature. This conceptualization allows us to 
analyze not only how contending ideas co-mingle or more overtly contest, if not – at least to 
some extent - even reverse the flow of global financial diffusion, but also how these complex 
dynamics unfold over time.  
 In the remainder of this paper, we apply our approach to the case of Islamic finance, 
specifically to the dynamic development of one category of instrument in this market: sukuk. 
To facilitate a nuanced and fine-grained analysis, we disaggregate the instrument into four 
constituent elements: conceptual design, legal documentation, investor marketing and 
economic outcome (see Table 2). Our analysis in the following sections highlights different 
degrees of melding of ‘conventional’ and Islamic financial ideas that occur in different 
constituent elements across space and time. Observed variation in the grafting of Islamic with 
‘conventional’ ideas of finance in these market practices speaks to wider concerns about 
financial stability, politico-economic organization and socio-economic justice. 
 
[Insert table 2 around here] 
 
GRAFTING AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF SUKUK 
Islamic finance, in its current guise, is a distinctively modern phenomenon. The first modern 
Islamic financial institutions were established in former British colonies – Egypt, Pakistan 
and Malaysia - in the 1960s and mainly targeted rural populations. Following the oil price 
hike of the 1970s, the first full-fledged private Islamic banks were set up. However, only 
from the late-1990s onwards did Islamic finance gain increasing traction with international 
financial markets, riding on the diffusion of financial liberalization (Warde 2010). Islamic 
finance thus has an ambiguous relationship with contemporary finance as both part of and 
resistance to the diffusion of financial liberalization. As Bill Maurer (2005: 9) observed, 
‘(t)he end of Bretton Woods and the oil price rises that flooded the world with petrodollars, 
for example, co-occurred with a new quest for purity on the part of wealthy Middle Eastern 
Muslims seeking a means to clear consciences, give alms, and spiritually renew themselves.’ 
While to many of its advocates, Islamic finance is a reaction to dominant ideas and practices 
of finance, and to the excesses of neoliberal financialization more specifically, we suggest 
that the phenomenon of Islamic finance is better understood as a ‘grafted’ outcome that 
embodies ideas and practices from both ‘conventional’ finance and Islam, rather than as an 
12 
alternative – or parallel – economy. This is especially so if we look at how the complex 
dynamics of Islamic finance have unfolded over time. 
This observation is also illustrated by the rapid expansion of Islamic finance. While the 
market might once have been restricted to the Muslim community and Muslim countries, its 
elevation to the main stage of global finance was well and truly heralded when it was 
embraced by mainstream financial actors such as investment bank Goldman Sachs and the 
British and Hong Kong governments who all started issuing sukuk in 2014. Our analysis of 
the development of sukuk in this paper confirms this tension and Islamic finance’s ambiguous 
relationship with ‘conventional’ finance, but our findings go further to reveal temporal and 
spatial variations in how ideas from Islam and ‘conventional’ financial markets are grafted in 
Islamic finance. These variations can be explained by differences in the normative and 
material preferences of key actors and institutional constraints posed by developments in the 
conventional sector. The instruments and practices of Islamic finance are grafted outcomes in 
that they do not adhere strictly or purely to Islamic ideas, but also embody ideas and practices 
from ‘conventional’ finance.  
The governance of Islamic finance is distinctive in that it involves the participation of 
experts in Islamic law, so-called sharia scholars, to ensure compliance with sharia principles. 
They endorse products and these endorsements are referred to in the industry as fatwa (Daud 
2016). In Islamic law, a fatwa has the status of a non-binding legal opinion – in this case on 
whether a specific financial product or practice is sharia-compliant or not. In Islamic finance, 
fatwa are typically issued by a collective of scholars, operating at the product and/or firm 
level. However, a number of countries, including Indonesia and Malaysia, also operate sharia 
boards at the national level and the trend is towards more centralized forms of sharia 
governance (Lindsey and Steiner 2012; Maznah and Saravanamuttu 2015).  
Sharia scholars employ interpretation and analogous reasoning techniques in assessing 
financial products (e.g. Pollard and Samers 2007). Certification via sharia boards is an 
important means to bestow Islamic legitimacy on Islamic financial products, but this should 
not be equated with the product being universally accepted. Indeed, sharia interpretations 
may vary and it has become common practice to include an exhortation to ‘potential investors 
[to] obtain their own independent Sharia advice as to the compliance of the Transaction 
Documents and the issue and trading of the Certificates with Sharia principles’ in the 
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prospectus for a new sukuk offering (HM Treasury 2014).6 As Pitluck (2016, p. 367) 
succinctly puts it, ‘there is no single theory of how to interpret [Islamic financial principles], 
and thus no singular definition as to what constitutes Islamic finance and what does not’. This 
ambiguity is very much a constitutive feature of Islamic finance and sets it apart from the 
naturalizing discourses underpinning much of contemporary market practice (Rethel 2018fc).     
 
[Insert table 3 around here] 
 
The value of total outstanding sukuk in the global market was estimated to amount to 
US$321 billion at the end of 2015, with the Malaysian market having a 57 percent share 
(IIFM 2016). As Table 3 indicates, sukuk have increasingly been taken up by mainstream 
actors and markets – Muslims and Non-Muslims alike – and this includes the issuers, the 
actors who engineer/structure the instruments and the investors. 
 
Grafting the First Sukuk 
The first sukuk of the modern era is usually traced back to an issuance by Shell MDS in 
Malaysia in 1990 to part fund a middle distillate synthesis (MDS) plant that converted natural 
gas to produce petroleum products.7 Aside from being a landmark development in Islamic 
finance, the MDS plant made scientific and technological history as the first commercial gas-
to-liquids plant that was developed in response to the energy crises of earlier decades.  
A number of banks had put in bids to provide financing for the Shell MDS project. 
While the bulk of funding was arranged ‘conventionally’, key actors within Shell, notably its 
then Chief Finance Officer, were interested in soliciting some of its financing in an Islamic 
manner (Alim 2013). It has been suggested that a prevailing ethos of innovation and 
creativity in Shell influenced this decision.8 As Islamic banking was at the time a new and 
                                                 
6 See table 3 for further information about the firm-level sharia boards and advisory firms that were involved in 
approving a number of recent sukuk.  
7 The Islamic notes raised MYR125 million out of a larger funding package that was in excess of MYR1.1 
billion, see Reuters (1990). 
8 This view was expressed by two interviewees during fieldwork conducted in Kuala Lumpur in September 
2014. 
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emerging phenomenon in Malaysia,9 there were certainly conceptual synergies between 
exploring novel forms of financing to fund the construction of a technologically 
groundbreaking infrastructure. Moreover, as a big multinational corporation, Shell had the 
material resources and experience to invest exploring and developing new financial 
instruments, which involved lengthy negotiations on the financial and legal aspects.10 
Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad - at the time the country’s first and only Islamic bank - 
was approached by Shell to offer a form of private debt security (as corporate bonds were 
then called in Malaysia) that complied with Islamic principles. The main engineer of the 
Shell MDS sukuk at Bank Islam, having had prior experience in the conventional private debt 
market, modeled the sukuk on promissory or loan notes. The main obstacle was that interest 
payments were an integral component of these promissory notes, which were overcome by 
combining a sale-and-purchase contract with the creation of a trust to hold the assets that 
were being funded by the issuance on behalf of lenders. This was the genesis of the now 
(post-GFC) infamous special purpose vehicles that are ubiquitous in contemporary sukuk. 
The trust, or the SPV, acted as an intermediary between the funds provided by investors and 
the tangible assets for which Shell MDS required funding. Incorporating the trust into the 
structure of the financial instrument was necessary to enable Shell MDS to defer payments 
for the purchase of the assets as they might have done with a conventional bond. However, 
more importantly it created a clear link between the funding and the tangible assets, thus 
providing evidence of its compliance with sharia. This approach to structuring an Islamic 
form of financing, combining a sale-and-purchase agreement with deferred payment, is 
known as the Islamic contract of bai’ bithaman ajil (BBA).  
The participating investors were three Malaysian Islamic financial institutions, namely 
Bank Islam itself, Tabung Haji (the pilgrimage fund) and Syarikat Takaful Malaysia 
Sendirian Berhad (the first and at that time only Malaysian Islamic insurance company); 
Cagamas (the recently created National Mortgage Corporation of Malaysia); two state-owned 
non-financial corporations; two Malaysian development finance institutions; a Malaysian 
commercial bank and Bank of Tokyo Ltd (Reuters 1990). Thus, the Shell sukuk found a ready 
market dominated by Islamic and/or government-linked investors.   
                                                 
9 The first Islamic bank in Malaysia was established in 1983, with the second following only in 1999. For an 
overview of the development of the Islamic banking and finance sector, see Lindsey and Steiner (2012). 
10 Interview with Islamic investment bankers and former Shell employee in September 2014 and May 2016. 
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This first corporate Islamic debt security quite clearly embodied ideas and practices that 
were diffused from conventional finance. In recounting how the Islamic form of corporate 
financing was designed or structured, the engineer of the instrument at Bank Islam freely uses 
the word ‘replicate’ and described how it was modeled on conventional instruments (see also 
Alim 2013: 134). The design of the instrument was based on ‘conventional’ papers right 
down to the incorporation of a ‘coupon’ that could be traded in the secondary market. These 
coupons are generally considered the interest element in ‘conventional’ papers. The 
instrument was priced using a formula taken from what was popularly known as the ‘Red 
Book’ issued by Bank Negara Malaysia, the Central Bank, which contained formulae used to 
calculate the pricing of all papers traded in the capital and money markets. The difference 
was that in calculating the price of the Islamic instrument, the variable for ‘interest’ was 
replaced with the desired ‘profit’. The ‘profit’ itself was benchmarked against equivalent 
private debt securities in the ‘conventional’ market in order to render the instrument 
competitive for both the issuer (Shell MDS) and investors.  
Formally, the Shell MDS paper also had to comply with the then prevailing regulatory 
framework detailed in Guidelines for the Issuance of Private Debt Securities, a document 
issued by the Central Bank in 1989 with the aim to develop the at the time nascent 
‘conventional’ bond market. Compliance with the guidelines meant that the instrument could 
be classified by the Central Bank, the then regulator of the capital market, in the same class 
as ‘conventional’ private debt securities to allow secondary trading to take place. As the 
Malaysian corporate bond market was a relatively new and underdeveloped market at this 
point in time, the legal effect of this new instrument was also strongly influenced by Shell’s 
in-house legal team who had both the expertise and capacity to draft legal documentation 
from their experience with ‘conventional’ and international finance. While this facilitated 
graft-take, it also meant that the sukuk was more a localized ‘conventional’ bond than a 
radically new instrument. In short, ideas and practices from ‘conventional’ finance permeated 
the design, the legal documents and the economic outcome of the Islamic financial 
instrument. 
The preponderance of ‘conventional’ financial ideas in this purportedly Islamic 
financial product had a number of explanations. First, there was outright emulation that came 
from financial practitioners borrowing ideas based on their experience with and knowledge of 
‘conventional’ finance. Second, market players in the financial sector held specific 
understandings and expectations of financial instruments to which proponents of Islamic 
financial instruments had to cater. The engineers of the Shell MDS sukuk at Bank Islam felt 
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obliged to design the Islamic instrument so as to be almost indistinguishable from 
‘conventional’ papers in order that the former would be easily understood and recognized by 
investors in the market. Similarly, at the institutional level there was only one framework in 
Malaysia to regulate bond-like instruments for corporate financing, with which the Shell 
MDS sukuk had to comply thus requiring it to possess certain characteristics including a fixed 
rate coupon, being tradable and behaving like debt. 
Despite the successful and extensive absorption of ‘conventional’ ideas and practices 
into this first Islamic sukuk, one of its engineers contended that the design was innovative in 
how it securitized a number of assets to the SPV in order to provide a material foundation to 
the financial instrument, thus complying with sharia. Through the trust, Bank Islam, as lead 
arranger, and the nine other banks and firms bought these assets for the MDS plant that were 
then sold back to Shell MDS at a profit. Securitization was, however, not a new concept but 
was a practice that had a long history in the conventional sector dating as far back as at least 
the eighteenth century (Frehen et al. 2014). What was new in the Shell MDS instrument, in 
our view, is the grafting of Islamic arguments onto a modified form of a securitized loan to 
ensure its ethical acceptance. In the ‘conventional’ sector, securitization is normally 
undertaken to minimize the risk of default (the idea of collateral), or more generally to isolate 
financial risk.  
However, in Islamic finance, securitization is conducted primarily to comply with 
ethical precepts rather than risk management, although concern over the latter is also part of 
sharia. This was the case with the Shell MDS sukuk as the ultimate guarantor of the financing 
for lenders was not so much the assets but rather the reputation and financial stability of 
Shell, the multinational corporation. Securitization in the sukuk was brought about by the 
grafting of Islamic ideas onto those of the conventional sector, and the SPV was a device to 
transform forbidden interest-based debt into permissible religiously compliant financing. This 
grafting to comply with religious precepts was an arguably relatively small component of 
what was otherwise a financial instrument infused with ideas and practices from conventional 
finance. It is here that most of the norm localization stories would end, and where the 
contestation of the design and structure of corporate bonds begins. Although culturally 
incompatible elements were stripped out when corporate bond finance arrived in Malaysia – 
the localization argument – by infusing ‘conventional’ bonds with Islamic ideas, it gave rise 
to the birth of a new kind of financial instrument and the global market for Islamic financial 
instruments. The commitment to developing financial instruments in compliance with – if not 
organized around – Islamic financial principles would gain greater traction over time. 
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Improving and Renewing the Graft 
Sukuk issuance took off in the 2000s, initially in Malaysia and then elsewhere in the Islamic 
world. Most of the financial instruments in the earlier part of this period adopted the BBA 
and another similar approach, murabaha (cost-plus financing), in its structure. Together, they 
became the preferred approaches to financing projects that have long gestation periods due to 
the fixed return nature of these securities (Saifuddin 2001). These instruments were however 
heavily criticized for their similarity to debt financing, reflecting the preponderance of ideas 
from ‘conventional’ finance in the process of grafting the instruments with Islamic ideas 
(Wan Hashim and Hassan 2011). 
Partially in response to these criticisms, in particular the refusal of Middle Eastern 
scholars to accept the BBA structure, and partially driven by the desire to innovate on the part 
of proponents of the industry, an alternative financial structure was popularized in the market 
in 2001 when a Malaysian public listed company issued a tradable sukuk using an ijara 
contract.11 This structure, developed by Bank Islam, was also adopted by the Malaysian 
government when it issued the first ever global sovereign sukuk in 2002, with HSBC as the 
lead arranger.12 Denominated in US$, the 2002 sukuk was directly marketed to international 
investors with roadshows being conducted in Hong Kong, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Bahrain and 
Jeddah (Montagu-Pollock 2002). The investor base included both Islamic and conventional 
investors with an order book that held 51 accounts from 17 countries – with the issue being 
allocated to investors from the Middle East (50%), followed by Asia (30%), Europe (16%) 
and the US (4%) (Horne 2002). 
The ijara structure was at the time deemed a breakthrough as the instrument 
represented ownership in assets, as opposed to mere securitization, and was therefore more 
clearly not a form of debt. This meant that ijara contracts complied more strongly with sharia 
and therefore embraced greater elements of Islamic ideas in their design. In our horticultural 
analogy, if oranges were Islamic ideas of finance, one can think of ijara as the product of a 
strengthening of the orange content in a bizzaria graft.  
However, legal provisions in the underlying contracts frequently undermined the ‘true’ 
transfer of ownership of these assets. In the case of the Malaysian sovereign sukuk, investors 
                                                 
11 Ijara is similar to a lease in conventional finance.  
12 The ijara structure had previously been used in project finance, most famously to finance the Equate project 
in Kuwait (Esty 2000), as well as in sovereign issuance by the Bahrain Monetary Authority in 2001. 
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were merely vested with ‘beneficial ownership’ of the asset and not ‘true’ ownership due to 
restrictions that arose from prior obligations made on pre-existing international bonds that the 
government had issued (Haneef 2009: 108-9). In other words, there were institutional 
constraints on the ability to infuse the instrument with Islamic ideas, which in this case 
should have resulted in a transfer of the legal ownership of the asset. This, in combination 
with pressures from potential investors, resulted in the adoption of a practice from 
‘conventional’ finance (the idea of ‘beneficial ownership’) that compromised the instruments’ 
compliance with sharia. Despite this deviation from Islamic precepts, the originally slow 
pace of its adoption in the market had more to do with the difficulty of identifying suitable 
assets that could be used to underpin the issue of these instruments in order to provide the 
link with tangible assets as required by sharia.13 Sovereign issuers had great difficulty in 
identifying suitable public assets where ownership could be transferred away, as required by 
the ijara structure, without raising public alarm. Corporate issuers also faced a shortage of 
suitable assets that had not previously been encumbered. 
In attempts to reconcile religious precepts with prevailing market dynamics, market 
actors turned instead to alternative contracts like musharaka (investment partnership) and 
mudharaba (investment management partnership).14 These contracts contained elements of 
equity or partnership, and were deemed to be more compliant with sharia. In principle, the 
innovation of these new structures was the integration of an element of risk sharing into mass 
corporate financing, as these instruments should offer no fixed return, nor guarantee or 
security. They were designed in opposition to fixed-income conventional bonds and were 
intended to be more profit sharing in nature. These design features could however not legally 
exist under the prevailing regulatory framework that governed private debt securities in 
Malaysia that emphasized limited liability. Since the government supported the development 
of the Islamic finance market, it began to issue new guidelines that were specifically tailored 
to these types of Islamic securities in 2004.15 The regulatory framework could be likened, in 
our horticultural analogy, to the soil composition not being amenable to the graft and thus 
requiring replacement.  
                                                 
13 Ijara structures have since become the standard contract for government sukuk.  
14 For a detailed discussion of and graphic representations of these structures, see 
http://www.islamicbanker.com/education/sukuk-al-musharaka for musharaka and 
http://www.islamicbanker.com/education/sukuk-al-mudaraba for mudharaba. 
15 These guidelines were updated in 2011, 2012 and 2014. 
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However, the exposure of investors to these economic risks was frequently undermined 
through purchase undertakings or other financial obligations (such as indirectly guaranteeing 
capital or delivering fixed returns) that were built into the legal contracts (Haneef 2009). 
These techniques were called ‘credit enhancements’ and were adopted to solicit investors and 
secure better ratings, in other words, in response to market demands and institutional 
dynamics. So the financial and legal effect of the instrument that came from Islamic ideas 
about finance were neutered, despite the obvious difference in the design of the financial 
instrument compared with those in the ‘conventional’ sector, although the materiality of that 
too has been questioned (Haneef 2009). 
 Recognizing these issues, the sharia board of the Accounting and Auditing 
Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), a Bahrain-based global standard 
setting body in Islamic finance, issued a fatwa in February 2008 that restricted the use of 
certain ‘credit enhancements’ in musharaka and mudharaba sukuk issued in the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC).16 There was a precipitous drop in issuances of sukuk globally 
after the fatwa was issued – compounded by market uncertainty at the height of the GFC. 
This pointed to a difficulty in producing and marketing instruments that embodied more 
substantively ideas that were derived from and were therefore more compliant with sharia. In 
our horticulture analogy, not only was it difficult to produce a bizzaria that contained a higher 
orange content, but it was also difficult to find a market for such a graft. When the market 
rebounded from 2010 onwards, practitioners went back to the earlier ijara structures as well 
as a new contract called wakala. 
A wakala is an arrangement whereby one party entrusts another to act on its behalf, and 
is therefore akin to an agency arrangement. In a wakala sukuk, the originator appoints an 
agent to invest or manage assets provided by the originator as part of a complex set of 
economic transactions in order to provide a form of financing.17 By contrast, in 
‘conventional’ finance, an agency agreement is merely an arrangement to manage assets, not 
to provide financing. The wakala sukuk is in principle a completely novel approach to 
                                                 
16 See Bi (2008) for an analysis of the import of this statement from a practitioner’s perspective. In mid-2009, 
the GCC held the dominant share of the international (that is, foreign currency denominated) sukuk market with 
83 per cent, whilst Malaysia held the biggest share of domestic sukuk markets with 66 per cent and a share of 53 
per cent of the global sukuk market (both domestic and international) (IIFM 2009: 12).   
17 For a discussion of how wakala sukuk is structured, see http://www.islamicbanker.com/education/sukuk-al-
wakala.  
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designing a financial instrument taking a number of economic transactions that are common 
in conventional finance but are given new normative meaning as a result of how they are 
structured in order to provide a form of financing that complies with sharia. It is a clear 
attempt at improving the robustness of the graft. However, sharia compliance is undermined 
in practice as practitioners in the market frequently link wakala instruments with the purchase 
of commodity murabaha. The latter, as noted earlier, is a form of Islamic contract that closely 
mirrors conventional debt. So, despite earlier criticisms and lessons, debt-based contracts, 
with their preponderance of ‘conventional’ rather than Islamic ideas, have not completely 
disappeared but have been grafted back onto what are otherwise relatively ‘purer’ forms of 
Islamic financial structures.  
It is worth noting that grafting takes into account dynamic developments with regard to 
both foreign and local ideas and practices; indeed, the line between the two can appear 
increasingly blurred given that sukuk has become a staple in global financial markets. Social 
impact bonds – or SIBs – are a recent innovation in conventional financial markets that seek 
to meld commercial and social objectives. More specifically, SIBs are issued to finance for 
example welfare projects – such as addressing the issue of rough sleeping and homelessness. 
Financial returns are directly linked to meeting pre-agreed targets with regard to the delivery 
of welfare projects (Andreu 2016). In an interesting attempt at graft renewal, 2015 saw the 
issuance of the first Social Impact sukuk to fund educational projects (Reuters 2015). In this 
instance, a new graft product developed in the conventional financial space was grafted back 
into Islamic finance, again highlighting the need for more nuanced accounts of the complex 
dynamics of financial change and how it takes place over time. 
One result of contestation is that outcomes are not ‘neat’. Sets of ideas may survive, 
but not necessarily in their original forms. Until today, the prevalence of debt-based contracts 
in Islamic finance, characterized by the shifting of risks and sometimes tenuous links to the 
real economy, undermines the argument that Islamic finance charts an alternative pathway to 
organizing finance that is radically different from its ‘conventional’ counterpart. 
Nevertheless, there is an observable shift in the balance of Islamic and conventional ideas in 
the dynamic development of sukuk grafts over time. Increasingly more Islamic elements have 
been embedded into the design of sukuk, but the material preferences of investors and 
institutional dynamics of the market constrain the ability for sukuk to deviate on legal 
documentation and economic outcome. The contestation between Islamic and ‘conventional’ 
ideas coupled with the relative but not complete freedom to chart an alternative path results in 
the grafted outcome of Islamic finance. 
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Grafting and the Pluralization of Economic Practice 
In this paper, we have argued that the emergence and rapid expansion of sukuk are best 
understood as the outcome of the grafting of Islamic and conventional financial ideas and 
practices. Contextual, agential and even commercial factors contributed to developing the 
market. In Muslim societies, one might expect ready market demand for financial products 
that allow Muslims to comply with their religious obligations.18 The development of Islamic 
financial markets might also be the result of norm entrepreneurship or broader social 
pressures that support particular causes. This push for local or alternate ideas would be 
expected to filter into policy decisions such as in Malaysia where the growth and 
development of Islamic finance are widely recognized to be supported by government as a 
result of a policy decision to develop an alternate market (Lai 2015).  
We traced how, through an iterative process of grafting, the Islamic ‘content’ of sukuk 
was successively strengthened. The success of this depended on a relatively coherent body of 
Islamic financial ideas in the first instance. With Bank Islam (and its sharia board), there was 
a stock of clearly formulated Islamic financial ideas on which actors could draw. Institutional 
changes such as the 1996 creation of a national sharia advisory council located at the 
Securities Commission in Malaysia contributed to the further consolidation of Islamic 
financial ideas – as did the emergence and growing influence of international Islamic 
financial standard setters such as AAOIFI (Rethel 2011; Lindsey and Steiner 2012).19 With 
the growing importance of sukuk in financial markets, resources were deployed to build 
market-supporting infrastructures, including efforts to expand the knowledge base by setting 
up research and training institutions as well as accreditation bodies (Maznah and 
Saravanamuttu 2015).  
                                                 
18 The evidence of empirical studies is however inconclusive. Studies conducted by Erol and El-Bdour (1989), 
Haron et al. (1994), Gerrard and Cunningham (1997), Metawa and Almossawi (1998) and Naser et al. (1999) 
queried the influence of Islamic teachings on the choice of whether to patronize an Islamic bank with varying 
results. Customers in Bahrain gave more importance to religion when selecting their bank, while customers in 
Jordan, Malaysia and Singapore considered religion and profit as equally important in the decision making 
process. Another study by Pepinsky (2013) on Indonesia found no evidence that Islamic piety had any 
systematic effect on consumers’ choice of Islamic versus conventional financial products.  
19 Indonesia created DSN-MUI, the national sharia board for Islamic finance in 1999, Bahrain is currently in the 
process of drafting legislation to this effect; however, national models of sharia governance continue to exhibit 
variety.   
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The market entry of big international financial firms was a critical moment in the 
mainstreaming of Islamic capital markets – and has indeed contributed to the acceptance of 
Islamic finance in core markets such as the UK and the USA. Norm entrepreneurs within 
these firms – such as Iqbal Khan at HSBC, Rushdi Siddiqui at Dow Jones Indexes and many 
others – saw a market opportunity and pushed their organizations to take Islamic finance 
seriously (Alim 2013). However, in terms of structuring sukuk specifically, the market 
dominance of a small array of investment banks, law firms and their like can contribute to 
pathological aspects of the graft. As an example, we discussed the use of credit enhancements 
to assure favorable ratings earlier in the paper. Unsurprisingly, the dependence on 
conventional bankers switching to the Islamic finance space increasingly proved to be a 
limitation, given that it made it more difficult to move beyond conventional market practice 
as a reference point. Nevertheless, with the growing significance of the market, a new cohort 
of Islamic financial market practitioners that grew up within the market has emerged, which 
has had a stabilizing effect.20  
The emergence and development of sukuk depended on the existence of investable 
pools of capital; such as the initial investments by Tabung Haji and Bank Islam in the very 
first corporate sukuk discussed earlier.21 Demand for sukuk is intermediated by financial 
structure, namely the existence of banks and institutional investors such as pension funds and 
their like as well as their appetite for Islamic financial assets. Perhaps worth mentioning here 
is that as a result of the greater availability of and familiarity with sukuk, pension funds have 
been able to expand their offer range to retail investors. For example, both the Malaysian 
Employees’ Provident Fund and the UK Universities Superannuation Scheme introduced 
Islamic savings options in 2016. On the borrower side, we can also detect growing interest 
with the spate of debut issuances in 2014 discussed earlier being a case in point. However, we 
should also bear in mind that these issuances occurred in a specific context, namely high 
                                                 
20 Similar dynamics are at play with regard to lawyers and legal documentation. 
21 Regulatory stipulations mean that the financial instruments on which we focus in this paper – sukuk – can 
only be marketed to ‘sophisticated’ investors. We thus hesitate to make inferences about the relationship 
between piety, or indeed religious conservatism, and demand for sukuk from our evidence base. See, however, 
the studies mentioned earlier. In a handful of countries including Malaysia and Indonesia, a limited number of 
savings sukuk have been offered to retail investors. These met with great demand, but were also heavily 
marketed by state actors.  
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global liquidity as a result of quantitative easing and anticipation of the end of the Fed taper 
in October 2014.  
Whereas pre-GFC accounts of the development of Islamic finance emphasize 
pressures for convergence and its ‘increasingly Western character’ (Pollard and Samers 2007: 
326; see also Rethel 2011), our analysis highlights a sustained commitment to challenging 
financial market practices that are deemed to be un-Islamic as well as greater efforts to 
enhance the sharia quality of sukuk. This is not to ignore significant pressures for 
convergence as succinctly summarized by Pitluck (2016). Nevertheless, the development of 
sukuk also represents an active attempt to produce a sharia-compliant alternative financial 
instrument that is competitive in the global financial market place. As in other stories of 
diffusion, the degree of agency and both the strength and compatibility of alternative ideas 
were important determinants of graft-take and longevity.  
However, unlike many of these other accounts, in a grafting approach these are – at 
least to some extent – endogenously generated factors. Thus, we have shown that in the case 
of Islamic finance, agency increased as the market developed and the familiarity of issuers, 
engineers and investors with the concept of sukuk and underlying contracts grew. This was in 
turn helped by an increasingly rich – and codified - body of Islamic financial knowledge as 
well as progressively institutionalized practices of sharia governance. Against this 
background, Islamic finance practitioners managed to convert opportunities provided by the 
economic environment – in particular shifting pools of liquidity driven by the search for yield 
in the early 2000s and again in the aftermath of the GFC - into a growing market share.  
 
CONCLUSION 
The growth of Islamic finance is part and parcel of an increasingly pluralistic global 
economy. The analysis of sukuk in this paper demonstrates that Islamic finance is clearly not 
just mere emulation of ‘conventional’ finance. However, neither is it able to completely step 
away from the latter’s shadow despite clear attempts to more fully embed Islamic ideas into 
the design and execution of new financial instruments. Islamic finance should therefore be 
understood as a product of the grafting of Islamic ideas, as embodied in sharia, and 
‘conventional’ financial ideas that have been diffused through market actors and institutional 
factors. Grafting constitutes a post-equilibrium approach that allows us to analyze both 
diffusion and the contestations it provokes. The approach clearly recognizes the dynamic 
nature of and ongoing shifts within the constituent elements of the grafted product. Grafts can 
24 
be improved and renewed, and as we have seen conventional and Islamic ideas can be re-
grafted in multiple ways. This is different from concepts such as layering or bricolage that 
give little analytical purchase to the ongoing development - and even alteration - of the 
source model(s) which we have shown to be pertinent with regard to both the improvement 
and renewal of grafts.  
Grafting portrays a dynamic form of contestation that goes beyond (local) adaptation, 
yet at the same time does not constitute the wholesale replacement of the source paradigm. 
This conceptualization enables a nuanced analysis not only of how contending ideas co-
mingle in, contest and in some cases even reverse the flow of global financial diffusion, but 
also – and importantly - how these dynamics change over time and how they are subject to 
both push and pull factors. At times, the differences between Islamic and conventional 
finance that we have described may seem incremental, if not rather small. However, they are 
not inconsequential, as we have demonstrated in this paper, and they should not be dismissed, 
for ‘gradual changes can be of great significance in their own right; and gradually unfolding 
changes may be hugely consequential as causes of other outcomes’ (Mahoney and Thelen 
2010: 3; see also Hobson and Seabrooke 2007). This is particularly important, as the fallout 
from the GFC has very clearly put ethical considerations on the financial reform agenda. 
Analyzing Islamic finance as a product of grafting usefully highlights a number of tensions 
and contestations that have political, economic, policy and analytical implications.  
First, there is the contestation of ideas between Islamic and conventional finance. The 
notion of grafting suggests the inability of the former to fully displace the latter. Conversely, 
the case of Islamic finance clearly shows that countries at the periphery of global finance 
have the agency to create a space for taking alternative ideas to the market and doing so 
successfully. It would be wrong to delegate their role to that of being merely norm-takers.  
Second, grafting highlights the push and pull of material, institutional and normative 
forces that support both conventional and Islamic finance, all of which condition the complex 
dynamics of Islamic financial instruments. Commercial factors are widely perceived to 
determine the market demand for and viability of sukuk instruments while sharia compliance 
determines the validity and recognition of sukuk products as true Islamic financial 
instruments, and therefore a ‘real’ alternative to conventional finance (RAM Ratings 2013).  
Third, grafting highlights an internal tension that exists within the contemporary 
manifestation of Islamic finance as a result of compromises that have been made in the 
contestation of ideas between Islamic and conventional finance. This internal tension raises 
questions about the continuing accommodation between Islamic and conventional ideas in 
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Islamic financial instruments, and the long-term viability of the Islamic finance market. 
These multiple tensions, both internal and external to Islamic finance, potentially create limits 
on the development over time of Islamic financial instruments, and therefore on the 
industry’s ability to chart an independent path that would challenge and offer a viable 'true' 
alternative to conventional finance, which has been so criticized since the crisis of 2008-9.  
Finally, for International Political Economy, the notion of grafting expands our 
analytical toolkit in particular to cases where harmonization, convergence or isomorphism in 
their pure forms are not observed in outcomes. Furthermore, as distinct from much of the 
localization work, the lens of grafting encourages us to analyze how new ideas are 
(potentially) projected back onto the international level as part of a growing global market, 
thus drawing attention to what could be thought of as processes of ‘reverse’ diffusion. 
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Table 1. Varieties of Diffusion 
 
 
Degrees of Agency 
Weak Strong 
Harmonization Coercive diffusion Socialized diffusion 
Non-harmonization Cosmetic diffusion Localization 
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Table 2. Key Constituent Elements of Financial Instruments 
Analytical Dimension Political Import And Effect 
Conceptual Design Embodies intent and purpose  
Legal Documentation Provides legal effect and obligations 
Investor Marketing Cultivates demand and distributes product 
Economic Outcome Measures distribution of value and risks 
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Table 3. Selected Sukuk Debuts in 2014 
 Issuer/ Exchange 
Listing Structure Lead Arranger Sharia Certification 
Issue Size/ 
Order Book Investor Distribution/ Investor Type  
United Kingdom/ 
 
 
London Stock 
Exchange 
Ijara HSBC and  
Barwa Bank, CIMB, 
NBAD, SCB 
 
 
Bait Al-Mashura Finance Consultations 
Company, Shariah Committee of CIMB 
Islamic Bank Bhd, The Executive Shariah 
Committee of HSBC Saudi Arabia Ltd and 
Standard Chartered 
Bank Shariah Supervisory Committee 
£200 million  
  
 
 
 
£2.3 billion 
39% UK, 37% Middle East, 24% Asia  
 
 
 
 
Investor type breakdown not provided 
Hong Kong 
 
 
Hong Kong, 
Bursa Malaysia, 
NASDAQ 
Dubai 
Ijara HSBC, SCB, CIMB, 
NBAD 
 
 
 
Executive Shariah Committee of HSBC Saudi 
Arabia Limited, Standard Chartered Bank 
Sharia Supervisory Committee, CIMB Islamic 
Bank Berhad and Shaikh Nedham Mohamed 
Saleh 
Abdulrahman Yaqobi 
US$1 billion 
 
 
 
 
US$4.7 billion 
36% Middle East, 47% Asia, 6% Europe, 11% 
US 
 
11% fund managers, 56% banks and private 
banks, 30% SWFs, central banks and 
supranationals, 3% insurance companies 
South Africa 
 
 
 
 
 
Luxembourg 
Stock Exchange 
Ijara BNP Paribas, KFH 
Investment, Standard 
Bank Group 
 
 
Members of the BNP Paribas Shari’a 
Supervisory Committee and the Shari’a 
Advisory Boards of KFH Investment Co. 
K.S.C.C. 
US$500 million 
 
 
 
 
US$2.24 billion 
23% UAE, 18% UK, 12% Qatar, 10% Saudi 
Arabia, 8% US Offshore, 7% Malaysia, 5% 
Bahrain, 3% South Africa, 14% other 
 
49% banks, 24% fund managers, 14% central 
banks, 10% hedge funds, 3% others  
Sharjah 
 
 
Irish Stock 
Exchange, 
NASDAQ 
Dubai 
Ijara HSBC and  
KFH, NBAD, Sharjah 
Islamic Bank, SCB  
 
 
Executive Shariah Committee of HSBC Saudi 
Arabia Limited, the Fatwa and Shari’a 
Supervisory Board 
of Sharjah Islamic Bank, the KFH Investment 
Sharia Board and the Shariah Supervisory 
Committee of Standard Chartered Bank 
US$750 million  
 
 
 
US$7.85 billion  
50% Middle East, 20% UK, 14% Asia and 
11% Europe (ex-UK), 5% others 
 
 
39%  banks, 39% fund managers, 18% central 
banks/official institutions, 2% insurance 
companies,  2% others  
Luxembourg 
(EMU) 
 
 
LuxSE 
Ijara HSBC, BNP Paribas 
 
 
 
Sharia Supervisory Committee of BNP 
Paribas and the Executive Shariah Committee 
of HSBC Saudi Arabia Limited 
€200 million  
 
 
 
€500 million 
61% Middle East and North Africa, 20% 
Europe, 19% Asia 
 
50% central banks and official institutions, 
40% banks, 10% asset managers 
Corporate Goldman Sachs 
 
 
 
LuxSE 
Wakala Goldman Sachs and 
Abu Dhabi Islamic 
Bank PJSC, Emirates 
NBD Capital, NBAD, 
NCB Capital, QInvest 
Shari’a Advisory Group consisting of 
Dr Abdul Sattar Abu Ghuddah;  Sheikh Nizam 
Yaqoby; and Dr Mohammed Elgari 
US$500 million  
 
 
US$1.5 billion 
87% Middle East, 11% Europe, 2% Asia 
 
 
77% banks, 22% asset managers, 1% private 
banks [sic!] 
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